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Caught in the Web:  
Enjoining Defamatory Speech  
that Appears on the Internet 
JOSEPH G. MARANO* 
Courts have consistently interpreted section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”) as shielding internet service providers from liability for defamatory content 
posted by users. This is a significant departure from traditional defamation law 
where publishers may be held liable for defamation upon reprinting defamatory 
material originally written or spoken by third parties. As this Note explains, the 
courts’ interpretations of section 230 are in direct conflict with the Act’s legislative 
history. Indeed, Congress made clear that the goal of section 230 was to protect 
websites that engaged in editorial self-regulation by deleting obscene and 
inappropriate content posted by users. 
 
Because of this immunity, plaintiffs who are defamed on the internet have little 
recourse, largely due to the practical limitations inherent in litigating online 
defamation claims. The California Court of Appeal has attempted to fashion a remedy 
for this situation. In Hassell v. Bird, a case pending before the California Supreme 
Court, the California Court of Appeal issued an injunction ordering Yelp to remove a 
defamatory review. This Note supports the Court of Appeal’s decision, and argues that 
the evolving nature of the internet, along with the overbroad immunity courts have 
read into section 230 of the CDA, necessitate a remedy. This Note suggests that to 
protect First Amendment rights, and to overcome the traditional presumption against 
injunctions in defamation cases, courts should design third-party injunctions to 
require websites to remove only language that a court has found to be defamatory, 
and to also afford websites the opportunity to try the case on the merits in the event 
of a default judgment. 
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A consistent problem over the last twenty years relates to 
defamatory statements that appear on review websites and other internet 
service providers such as Yelp.1 Until recently, recourse for internet 
defamation victims was virtually non-existent due to section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“section 230” and “CDA,” 
respectively).2 Congress promulgated the CDA as a response to what was 
known to some legislators as the Great Internet Sex Panic of 1995.3 The 
burgeoning internet was¾and still is¾home to a lot of pornography. The 
law’s purpose was primarily related to censorship and protecting 
children from encountering pornography online.4 
Although the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a 
majority of the censorship provisions of the CDA in Reno v. ACLU, the 
Court left section 230 intact.5 Section 230 is largely concerned with 
defamation, stating that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
 
 1. Associated Press, Yelp Is Not Liable for Bad ‘Star’ Ratings of Businesses, Court Rules, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016, 4:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-yelp-ruling-
20160912-snap-story.html. 
 2. See Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 3. The Communication Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, OFFENDER WATCH INITIATIVE, 
http://offenderwatchinitiative.org/Resources/CDA-Act (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). 
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provided by another information content provider.”6 Thus, unlike 
publishers of traditional media such as books and newspapers, civil 
liability for defamatory content created by third parties may not be 
imposed on internet service providers such as Yelp.7 Case law over the 
past twenty years has reflected this trend, and continues to this day.8 
Unsurprisingly, section 230 has hardly been able to keep pace with the 
multitude of breakthroughs that the technology sector innovates for the 
internet on a daily basis.9 As a result, courts are presented with a very 
important issue: how to protect and provide recourse for individuals and 
businesses defamed online, while still allowing the internet to function 
as a media platform where First Amendment rights are of paramount 
importance.  
Most recently, California courts have encountered this issue in 
Hassell v. Bird.10 In Hassell, a disgruntled client (“Bird”) allegedly 
defamed her lawyer (“Hassell”) by posting several unfavorable Yelp 
reviews under the pseudonym “Birdzeye B.”11 Only one of the reviews 
remains on Yelp.12 
 
 6. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2011). 
 7. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 8. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997); Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc.,  
836 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 9. See generally Ali Grace Zieglowsky, Note, Immoral Immunity: Using a Totality of the 
Circumstances Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 1307 (2010) (arguing that courts should adopt a “totality of circumstances” standard 
of review and abandon section 230 immunity); Patricia Spiccia, The Best Things in Life Are Not Free: 
Why Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Should Be Earned and Not 
Freely Given, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 369 (2013). 
 10. Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 11. Id. at 1343. 
 12. The review reads,  
well, here is another business that doesn’t even deserve one star. basically, dawn hassell 
made a bad situation much worse for me. she told me she could help with my personal injury 
case from falling through a floor, then reneged on the case because her mom had a broken 
leg, or something like that, and that the insurance company was too much for her to handle. 
and all of this after i met with her office (not her personally, she was nowhere to be found) 
signed paperwork to ‘hire’ them and gained confidence in her office (due mostly to yelp 
reviews) so, in all fairness, i have to share my experience so others can be forewarned. she 
will probably not do anything for you, except make your situation worse. in fact, after 
signing all the paperwork with her office, like a broken record, they repeated ‘DO NOT TALK 
TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY’ over and over and over. and over and over. so i honored 
that and did not speak to them. but, the hassell law group didnt ever speak with the 
insurance company either, neglecting their said responsibilities and not living up to their 
own legal contract! nor did they bother to communicate with me, the client or the insurance 
company AT ALL. then, she dropped the case because of her mother and seeming lack of 
work ethic. (a good attorney wont do this, in fact, they arent supposed to) to save your case, 
STEER CLEAR OF THIS LAW FIRM! and research around to find a law firm with a proven 
track record of success, a good work ethic, competence and long term client satisfaction. 
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Hassell filed her complaint in the San Francisco County Superior 
Court, and Bird, for whatever reason, never answered.13 As a result, 
Hassell obtained a default judgment in which the court imposed liability 
on Bird and enjoined Yelp, requiring the website to remove the reviews 
and disallow “Birdzeye B.” from posting additional reviews for Hassell’s 
law firm.14 Yelp appealed the decision on the basis that the CDA bars the 
court from issuing an injunction against a non-party.15 Nevertheless, the 
Court of Appeal largely upheld the trial court’s decision, invalidating only 
the portion of the injunction relating to Bird’s potential future reviews.16 
Consistent with section 230, the California Court of Appeal did not 
impose any liability on Yelp.17 Instead, the court attempted to solve the 
recurring problem of online defamation by fashioning a remedy that 
imposed liability only on the defaming party, while merely enjoining 
Yelp, a non-party to the lawsuit.18 The injunction requires Yelp to remove 
the defamatory review.19 Despite Yelp’s challenge to the contrary, the 
injunction is not actually an imposition of liability.20  
This remedy, though certainly an innovative solution, raises a host 
of legal questions. These include two interrelated issues: whether the law 
permits a court to issue an injunction against a non-party, and, if so, 
whether the remedy violates the First Amendment in the context of 
internet speech. As of December 2017, Hassell is on appeal before the 
California Supreme Court.21 This Note argues that the California Court of 
Appeal has fashioned a reasonably effective remedy for online 
defamation, but that the California Supreme Court should modify and 
narrow the remedy in order to better ensure protection of the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of expression.  
I.  THE CDA, SECTION 230 CASE LAW, AND NON-PARTY INJUNCTIONS 
An examination of section 230 and the CDA’s legislative history and 
subsequent case law is necessary to properly contextualize the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Hassell and analyze the injunction remedy. 
 
there are many in the bay area and with some diligent smart interviewing, you can find a 
competent attorney, but this wont be one of them. 
Birdzeye B., Yelp Review, YELP (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.yelp.com/biz/ 
hassell-law-group-san-francisco-2?start=20. 
 13. Hassell, 247 Cal. App. 4th at 1343. 
 14. Id. at 1341. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1363. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Hassell v. Bird, 381 P.3d 231 (Cal. 2016). 
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A. SECTION 230 OF THE CDA 
In 1996, Congress promulgated section 230 of the CDA to permit 
and encourage freedom of expression on the internet.22 Congress also 
intended to protect websites and internet service providers, which 
include websites that allow users to post reviews, online forums and 
message boards, social media services, and other online channels of 
communication, from liability for third-party content produced by users 
of such websites.23 
Prior to the enactment of section 230, while Congress was drafting 
and debating the law, the Supreme Court of New York decided  
Stratton-Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Company.24 Indeed, section 
230 was, in part, a response to Stratton-Oakmont and served to overturn 
the court’s decision in that case.25 In Stratton-Oakmont, the key issue 
before the court was whether Prodigy, an online forum with subscribers 
who posted content and messages to the forum, should be considered a 
publisher for purposes of defamation law.26 In Stratton, an individual 
posted certain defamatory statements on the forum, alleging that 
Stratton-Oakmont and the company’s president committed criminal 
fraud in connection with a number of securities offerings.27 The court 
held that because Prodigy had policies in place regarding permissible 
user content, and also because Prodigy routinely edited and moderated 
offensive content that users posted, Prodigy should be considered a 
publisher similar to a newspaper.28 Importantly, the court emphasized 
that it was Prodigy’s policies and editorial actions relating to third-party 
content that were the key considerations in holding that Prodigy was a 
publisher, rather than the online equivalent to something more like a 
library or bookstore.29 The court also expressed the public policy concern 
that by editing users’ posts, Prodigy was restricting freedom of speech 
and expression on the internet.30 
While Congress certainly shared those First Amendment concerns, 
it disagreed with the court’s decision in Stratton-Oakmont.31 As a result, 
Congress passed the CDA the following year, with section 230 effectively 
 
 22. David Lukmire, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The 
Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 378–79 (2010). 
 23. Id. at 379. 
 24. Stratton-Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
 25. H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996). “One of the specific purposes of [section 230] is to 
overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy . . . .”  
 26. Stratton-Oakmont, Inc., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *2. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at *3–4. 
 29. Id. at *12–13. 
 30. Id. at *12. 
 31. H.R. Rep. No. 104–458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
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overturning Stratton-Oakmont.32 Congress intended for section 230 to 
provide a safe harbor for websites that were “Good Samaritans”¾those 
that took reasonable steps to screen content posted by third parties and 
remove content that was considered indecent or offensive.33 The idea was 
that by providing this safe harbor, Congress would encourage websites to 
self-regulate.34 Specifically, subsection (c) of section 230 states that “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”35 Subsection (c) also provides that websites will not be 
held liable for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access 
to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally 
protected.”36 
Rather than reading section 230(c) as a narrow safe harbor 
affording immunity to websites that self-regulate, courts have instead 
read the law as one that provides blanket, absolute immunity to all 
websites for any and all content produced by third parties.37 In this way, 
courts have essentially ignored the legislative intent behind section 230, 
opting instead for a close textual reading of the statute.38 As of this 
writing, Congress has done nothing to correct the courts’ misguided 
interpretations. 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Lukmire, supra note 22, at 378–80. 
 34. Lukmire, supra note 22, at 378–80. Specifically, Congress hoped that section 230 would 
incentivize internet service providers to censor offensive and indecent material that third parties might 
post. Indeed, Representative Christopher Cox stated during a hearing regarding the amendment to the 
CDA that would eventually become section 230, “We want to encourage [internet service providers] to 
do everything possible for us . . . to help us control, at the portals of our computer, at the front door of 
our house, what comes in and what our children see.” 141 CONG. REC. H. 8460 (1995). In addition, the 
House Committee Report on the bill further supports this contention. Specifically, the report states 
that “[o]ne of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any 
other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of 
content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material. The 
conferees believe that such decisions create serious obstacles to the important federal policy of 
empowering parents to determine the content of communications their children receive through 
interactive computer services.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996). Thus, legislative history 
indicates that Congress envisioned the Good Samaritan safe harbor to serve the narrow purpose of 
shielding from liability internet service providers that edit obscene and inappropriate content posted 
by users. This purpose is further supported by the statute itself, which invokes language related to 
pornography and violence. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2011). Clearly, Congress’s purpose in enacting 
the bill is squarely at odds with the courts’ broad interpretation of the statute’s language affording 
websites blanket liability for user content. 
 35. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
 36. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 37. See Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 2016); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 
F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 38. Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 330. 
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For the foregoing reasons, there is presently no recourse for those 
harmed by third-party content on websites. As Hassell demonstrates, 
suing individuals who write defamatory statements often leads 
nowhere¾such persons are loath to respond to complaints, resulting in 
default judgments that, due to the absence of the defendant, preclude the 
plaintiff from recovering.39 Furthermore, because internet anonymity 
often makes it impossible for plaintiffs to identify those who defame 
them in the first place,40 filing a lawsuit can become an impossibility. Due 
to section 230, defamed individuals have been precluded from recovering 
damages from websites that host defamatory statements.41 However, 
now that the California courts have attempted to fashion a remedy for 
individuals damaged by defamatory material on the internet,42 it is useful 
to examine a line of cases from Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the first 
case to render websites immune under section 230, to Hassell. Doing so 
reveals the nuances of section 230 and sheds light on the legal 
permissibility of the California Court of Appeal’s non-party injunction, 
along with its First Amendment implications. 
B. SECTION 230 CASE LAW 
Section 230 was first interpreted in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.43 
In Zeran, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
interpreted the language of section 230 quite broadly, holding that the 
statute immunizes internet services providers from liability for 
information originating from third parties.44 The facts of Zeran involved 
an anonymous individual who posted on AOL message boards that Zeran 
was selling distasteful shirts with offensive slogans related to the 
Oklahoma City bombing that occurred in 1995.45 The post included 
Zeran’s home phone number and invited other AOL users to call him in 
order to purchase the shirts.46 Unsurprisingly, this caused Zeran to 
receive abusive phone calls and death threats.47 AOL relied on part of 
section 23048 as a defense, and the court agreed, stating that “[b]y its 
plain language, [section] 230 creates federal immunity to any cause of 
 
 39. Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1343 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).  
 40. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329. 
 41. Id. at 330. 
 42. Hassell, 247 Cal. App. 4th at 1341. 
 43. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327. 
 44. Id. at 330. 
 45. Id. at 329. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2011). That section of the statute reads as follows: “No provider or user 
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.” 
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action that would make service providers liable for information 
originating with a third-party user of the service . . . preclud[ing] courts 
from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in 
a publisher’s role.”49 
Zeran also attempted to argue that even if the court held that AOL 
was immune from liability because it was a publisher, it could still be 
found liable for the defamatory statements as a distributor with 
knowledge of those statements.50 The court rejected this argument on the 
grounds that distributor liability is essentially equivalent to publisher 
liability. Specifically, the court stated that a distributor is necessarily a 
publisher and that, because the language of section 230 makes AOL a 
publisher, AOL could not be held liable.51 The court also discussed the 
Stratton-Oakmont decision, and Congress’s purpose of enacting section 
230 in order to create an incentive to self-regulate.52 The court’s 
textualist reading of the statute in Zeran was consistent with the part of 
the CDA’s legislative history promoting free communications on the 
internet. However, by granting blanket immunity to websites, the court 
effectively disincentivized the self-censorship that Congress intended 
when it passed section 230 and overturned Stratton-Oakmont. Absent 
the potential of liability for what their users write, websites might not 
have any reason to expend any resources regulating and censoring user 
content.  
Other federal courts have followed the Zeran decision. For example, 
in 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in 
Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc. that the statutory bar against website liability for 
user-generated content remained intact and could not be circumvented 
merely by way of “creative pleading.”53 That case, like Hassell, involved 
allegedly defamatory reviews posted on Yelp.54 Kimzey argued that even 
if Yelp was granted immunity under section 230, consistent with the 
interpretation in Zeran, the website could still be held liable because it 
allegedly had a hand in creating and developing the content.55 Kimzey 
further argued that by causing the defamatory review to appear as a 
promotion or ad on Google’s search engine, Yelp was also an 
“information content provider” as defined under subsection (f)(3) of 
section 230¾someone “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation 
 
 49. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
 50. Id. at 331. 
 51. Id. at 332. 
 52. Id. at 331. 
 53. Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 54. Id. at 1265–66. 
 55. Id. 
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or development of information.”56 In other words, if Yelp played a role in 
the development of the content, it could be held liable for defamation just 
as the person who wrote the review could be held liable.57 The court 
rejected this argument on the grounds that it was merely artful pleading 
designed to circumvent section 230’s safe harbor, and that promoting the 
review as an ad on Google did not meet the threshold of creating or 
developing content.58  
Kimzey illustrates two important points. First, courts continue to 
interpret section 230 as providing blanket immunity in the context of 
defamation law. Second, Kimzey’s argument about Yelp’s role in 
promoting the review presages an argument critical to the validity of the 
court’s injunction in Hassell¾that because Bird acted through Yelp to 
write her reviews, the court was permitted to enjoin Yelp, despite its 
status as a non-party.59 
Barrett v. Rosenthal is the most recent case involving a section 230 
defense that the California Supreme Court has decided.60 While the 
decision is consistent with prior California and federal decisions 
regarding section 230, the court, in dicta, also addressed the problem 
that the plaintiff in Kimzey raised¾websites that are actively involved in 
the creation of user content.61 In a footnote, the court stated that at a 
certain point a website’s active involvement in the creation of a 
defamatory statement would cause the website to suffer liability.62 The 
court did not address what sort of actions a website would have to take in 
order to share liability with a user, and acknowledged that “many courts 
have reasoned that participation going no further than the traditional 
editorial functions of a publisher cannot deprive a defendant of section 
230 immunity.”63 Thus, a website would have to do something more than 
act merely as a publisher in order to be subject to liability. Pursuant to 
Kimzey, actively promoting a defamatory statement on a search engine 
would not meet the court’s undetermined threshold.64  
Compare these cases to Fair Housing Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, a case in which the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the website defendant did not 
 
 56. Id. at 1266; 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (1996). 
 57. Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1267. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1355–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 60. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
 61. Id. at 527 n.19. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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enjoy section 230 immunity.65 In Roommates.com, several 
governmental housing organizations sued Roommate.com LLC and 
alleged that the website’s questionnaires related to users’ gender, race, 
sexual orientation, etc., violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).66 The 
court agreed, holding that Roommate.com LLC developed users’ answers 
to the questions by taking the answers and using them to match users 
with one another.67 The court provided some guidance as to what, 
precisely, “develop” means in the context of section 230, interpreting 
“the term ‘development’ as referring not to merely augmenting the 
content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged 
unlawfulness.”68  
While this guidance is useful in the context of FHA claims, no similar 
interpretations of section 230 have been put forth in relation to 
defamation claims. If nothing else, Roommates.com shows that courts 
are still working through the level of involvement required of a website 
to break the immunity that section 230 imposes. Indeed, for FHA claims 
that bar appears to be high. Furthermore, given that the case is ten years 
old as of this writing, modern advances in computing technology and 
search engine algorithms beget the issue of whether, today, a seemingly 
lower level of “development” might pass muster with courts as to breach 
the broad scope of section 230 immunity.  
While it does not appear that Yelp’s role in Hassell rises to the level 
of involvement the court mentions in Barrett or Roommates.com, it is 
reassuring that the California Supreme Court, albeit only in dicta, has 
finally acknowledged that the blanket immunity created by section 230 
is problematic.69 The court also appears to be cognizant of the fact that 
individuals who are defamed require guidance as to what extent a website 
must develop user content in order to lose section 230 immunity and, 
thus, provide defamed parties with recourse.70 The remedy applied in 
Hassell similarly requires website involvement, but to a much lower 
degree than the hypothetical liability thresholds discussed in Barrett or 
Roommates.com. Considering the background and history of the remedy 
the Court of Appeal ordered in Hassell highlights the benefits and 
detriments of the remedy, as well as the First Amendment issues 
implicated. 
 
 65. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Rommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 66. Id. at 1162. 
 67. Id. at 1168. 
 68. Id. at 1167–68. 
 69. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 527 n.19 (Cal. 2006). 
 70. This notion is evident in the mere fact that the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s 
injunction in Hassell v. Bird. 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
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C. INJUNCTIONS THAT RUN TO A NON-PARTY 
The history of injunctions that run to a non-party goes back over a 
century.71 The earliest case in which the United States Supreme Court 
issued such an injunction was In re Lennon, where the Court ruled that 
an injunction imposed on a railroad company was enforceable against 
one of its employees.72 Justice Brown wrote that “[t]o render a person 
amenable to an injunction it is neither necessary that he should have 
been a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued, nor to have 
actually been served with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have had 
actual notice.”73 In re Lennon establishes actual notice as a critical 
element required for a non-party injunction to be enforceable.74 
Importantly, only actual notice, as opposed to formal notice, is 
required.75 
Two decades after In re Lennon was decided, the California Supreme 
Court in Berger v. Superior Court issued a decision that foreshadowed 
the link between non-party injunctions and freedom of expression issues 
embodied in the First Amendment.76 Berger established a limitation on 
how wide non-party injunctions may be cast.77 In Berger, a group of 
individuals was enjoined from picketing a theater.78 Upon learning of the 
injunction, a new group of picketers began a demonstration of their 
own.79 Although the theater attempted to persuade the court that the 
injunction applied to the new group of picketers, the court disagreed with 
that argument.80 The court affirmed that it is common to have 
injunctions “run to classes of person through whom the enjoined party 
may act, such as agents, servants, employees, aiders, abettors, etc., 
though not parties to the action.”81 Because the new group of picketers 
was in no way related to the original group against which the theater 
obtained an injunction, the court held that the injunction could not apply 
to the new group of picketers.82  
Berger is important for three reasons. First, it illustrates how 
delicately courts must consider the relationship of the enjoined parties 
 
 71. In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897). 
 72. Id. at 554. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Berger v. Superior Court, 167 P. 143 (Cal. 1917). 
 77. Id. at 143. 
 78. Id. at 143–44. 
 79. Id. at 144. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Berger v. Superior Court, 167 P. 143, 144 (Cal. 1917). 
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when crafting a non-party injunction.83 Presumably, if the theater proved 
that the picketers were two subsets of members of a civic organization, or 
merely that the two groups were in communication with one another, the 
court may have reached the opposite conclusion. Second, the case 
exemplifies the level of scrutiny courts use in cases of non-party 
injunctions that relate to free speech and the First Amendment. Finally, 
the case sets forth several classes of persons that may be enjoined despite 
their non-party status.84 These classes include, most significantly for 
purposes of Hassell, individuals “through whom the enjoined party may 
act.”85  
A more recent case involving non-party injunctions is Ross v. 
Superior Court.86 Ross arose in the aftermath of Cooper v. Obledo.87 In 
Obledo, the California Supreme Court invalidated several provisions of a 
state welfare statute, and issued an injunction requiring the retroactive 
payment of benefits.88 One group of county supervisors refused to 
comply, arguing that the injunction only ran to the California 
Department of Health and Welfare, not the supervisors themselves.89 
Despite the fact that the supervisors were not parties to the original 
lawsuit, the court held that they were agents of the state agency and, thus, 
the injunction applied to them.90 Indeed, the trial court’s injunctive order 
was drafted such that it applied to the “defendants, their successors in 
office, agents and employees.”91  
Ross provides three additional points about non-party remedies. 
First, the court clarified the concept of an “agent,” and what types of 
individuals constitute agents for the purposes of non-party injunctions.92 
Specifically, the court confirmed that an individual or entity through 
which the enjoined party may act can be subject to a non-party 
injunction.93 Second, Ross established that non-party injunctions may 
require the enjoined party to act in a manner that has a retroactive 
effect.94 Finally, the court added the element of ability to comply with the 
requirements for issuing non-party injunctions.95 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Ross v. Superior Court, 569 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1977). 
 87. Id. at 729–30; Cooper v. Swoap, 524 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1974). The case was originally titled Cooper 
v. Swoap. 
 88. Ross, 569 P.2d at 730. 
 89. Id. at 729–31. 
 90. Id. at 733. 
 91. Ross, 569 P.2d at 731. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 738. 
 95. Id. 
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Overall, Ross identifies the broad range of classes of persons to 
which such an injunction can apply, and undercuts arguments a 
petitioner such as Yelp might raise to argue that such an injunction 
cannot apply to them. The retroactivity discussion in Ross is significant 
because it would not preclude a court from requiring a petitioner to 
remove defamatory user content from a website, such as in Hassell. Ross 
also reaffirms the requirement of actual notice, as opposed to formal 
notice, while adding ability to comply with the elements that must be met 
in order to issue non-party injunctions.96 
With sufficient background on the CDA and section 230, numerous 
courts’ interpretations of section 230, and the remedy that the court 
ordered in Hassell, it is necessary to turn to the actual application of said 
remedy. In doing so, two interrelated problems become apparent: 
whether the court’s imposition of the injunction against Yelp is permitted 
under the law, and whether the remedy, in the context of Yelp, violates 
the First Amendment. 
II. HOW THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SHOULD  
DECIDE HASSELL V. BIRD 
The California Supreme Court should partially affirm the lower 
court’s ruling by narrowing the scope of the injunction to preclude 
removal of future posts by Bird, and giving Yelp a chance to defend in 
court against the defamation claim. It is important that Yelp have the 
opportunity to do this given the sensitivity of First Amendment issues 
that the case raises, and due to Hassell’s receipt of a default judgment. In 
order to understand why the court should rule this way, consider first the 
consequences should the court reverse the Court of Appeal’s injunction 
entirely. 
A. THE CONSEQUENCES OF UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT’S DECISION 
Currently, most individuals who are the subject of defamatory 
statements posted on review websites, or anywhere on the internet for 
that matter, have essentially no recourse. A primary reason for this is 
internet anonymity. For example, in Zeran the plaintiff was forced to 
endure death threats, have his home placed under protective 
surveillance, and nearly shut down his business.97 Due to section 230 
immunity, Zeran did not recover any damages whatsoever.98 One might 
suggest that Zeran should have sued the person who wrote that he was 
selling t-shirts making light of the Oklahoma City bombings, but doing 
 
 96. Id. at 731–32. 
 97. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 98. Id. at 330. 
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so would have been impossible. Internet message boards, such as the one 
on which someone defamed the plaintiff in Zeran,99 along with review 
websites, comments on news articles, and a multitude of other internet 
service providers all permit users¾that is, content providers, which 
include individuals who post on the internet¾to remain anonymous.  
Theoretically, it might be possible for a website to use an Internet 
Protocol address (“IP address”) to cooperate with lawsuits and track 
down names and addresses of third-party content providers.100 This kind 
of cooperation, however, might burden websites. Indeed, the burden is 
likely higher than that brought on by the remedy ordered in Hassell, as 
websites would have to expend far more time and resources tracking 
down users via their IP addresses than they would by simply removing 
defamatory content. 
Identifying users is only the first in a long line of hurdles plaintiffs 
would have to jump to sue their defamers. Once identified, plaintiffs 
must serve defendants in order to recover. Service of process itself could 
be especially challenging, given the fact that identifying a plaintiff by way 
of his or her IP address would not necessarily yield a physical address at 
which to serve them.101  
In addition, getting the defendants to answer the complaint would 
be another challenge entirely. As Hassell illustrates, some defendants 
simply will not respond to the complaint.102 There are a number of 
reasons that a defendant might ignore the complaint. For example, 
perhaps a hacker used a random IP address to post defamatory 
statements online. Alternatively, perhaps an identified defendant does 
not care enough to respond to the complaint and would be perfectly 
happy if a court ordered the website to remove the language. For reasons 
unknown, Bird ignored Hassell’s complaint, resulting in a default 
judgment.103 The challenge of identifying the defamer, combined with 
the challenge of hauling him or her into court, are two prime reasons why 
the solution of simply suing the individual behind defamatory writings is 
simply impractical. 
A broader policy implication of not allowing recourse for victims of 
defamation becomes evident by way of analogy to other types of claims 
in which websites are deemed liable for their actions. In one such 
situation, websites¾in reality, the operators of such websites¾have 
 
 99. Id. at 329. 
 100. See Louise Story, How Do They Track You? Let Us Count the Ways, N.Y. TIMES: BITS  
(Mar. 9, 2008, 11:19 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/how-do-they-track-you-let-
us-count-the-ways/. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1343 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 103. Id.  
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been held liable for acting as a conduit for criminal activity.104 Perhaps 
the most infamous example is Silk Road, an online marketplace via the 
darknet where users could purchase illicit drugs, among other 
contraband.105 For several years, and with little success, law enforcement 
worked to prosecute individuals who purchased or sold drugs on Silk 
Road.106 The marketplace was finally shut down, at least temporarily 
until other parties created successor marketplaces such as Silk Road 2.0 
and Silk Road 3.0.107  
The story of Silk Road might be viewed as a microcosm of the larger 
issue of internet defamation. While prosecutors were unable to solve the 
problem of Silk Road by prosecuting its users, they prosecuted the person 
who ran Silk Road and succeeded in shutting down the marketplace.108 
Similarly, internet defamation cannot be addressed by targeting 
individual users, as explored at length above and exhibited perfectly by 
the problems presented by Hassell. If Congress refuses to update the 
language of section 230 to better reflect the innovative nature of the 
internet, along with their original goal of encouraging websites to  
self-censor, and if courts continue to interpret the poorly-written statute 
as granting blanket immunity to websites, the problem of internet 
defamation will never be solved. Thus, unless courts and Congress are 
determined to leave defamation victims with no recourse, a creative 
remedy involving the websites themselves, such as that of non-party 
injunctions, demands implementation. 
B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPLEMENTING THIS SOLUTION  
Due to the significant consequences of maintaining the status quo 
regarding section 230’s grant of total immunity, it is necessary to 
consider the problems that might arise should the California Supreme 
Court decide to partially affirm the Court of Appeal’s injunction by 
disallowing removal of future posts by Bird, and giving Yelp a chance to 
defend against the defamation claim. This remedy begs the question: can 
a court issue a non-party injunction ordering a website to remove 
arguably protected speech?  
 
 104. Benjamin Weiser, Ross Ulbricht, Creator of Silk Road Website, Is Sentenced to Life in Prison, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/nyregion/ross-ulbricht-creator 
-of-silk-road-website-is-sentenced-to-life-in-prison.html. 
 105. Adrian Chen, The Underground Website Where You Can Buy Any Drug Imaginable, GAWKER 
(June 1, 2011, 1:14 PM), http://gawker.com/5805928/the-underground-website-where-you-can-buy-
any-drug-imaginable [http://web.archive.org/web/20110603015735/].  
 106. Id. 
 107. Joseph Bradley, Silk Road 3.0 Is Back . . . Will It Last?, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (May 14, 2016, 
2:01 AM), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/silk-road-3-0-back-will-last/. 
 108. Supra note 104. 
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1. The Presumption Against Injunctions in Defamation Cases 
As a threshold issue, it is important to consider the long-standing 
rule that equitable remedies, such as injunctions, are not permitted in 
defamation cases because, functionally, they violate the Prior Restraint 
Doctrine.109 Professor Chemerinksy, a constitutional law scholar, has 
argued against the recent trend involving some courts that have departed 
from the aforementioned rule.110 Although the United States Supreme 
Court has never decided the question of whether injunctions are 
permissible in defamation cases,111 the California Supreme Court, in 
Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen held that “following a trial at 
which it is determined that the defendant defamed the plaintiff, the court 
may issue an injunction prohibiting the defendant from repeating . . . 
statements determined to be defamatory.”112 In addition, the court noted 
that such injunctions must be drawn in an extremely narrow manner as 
to avoid violating the Prior Restraint Doctrine.113 Nevertheless, in his 
article, Professor Chemerinsky argues that crafting narrow injunctions 
prohibiting defamatory speech would ultimately be useless and serve no 
functional purpose.114 On the other hand, a broader injunction that 
covers future speech would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.115  
While these are valid arguments for purposes of traditional 
defamation law, in cases of internet defamation, an individual’s 
defamatory speech can remain accessible for many years. People often 
consult Yelp when deciding to eat at a certain restaurant, use a particular 
business, or, as in Hassell, choose a personal injury lawyer. Indeed, in 
Hassell, the Court of Appeal’s injunction only applied to the existing 
reviews that Bird posted on Yelp.116 As mentioned above, the Court of 
Appeal remanded the case so that the trial court could reframe the 
injunction and eliminate the portion that requires Yelp to delete future 
reviews of Hassell’s law firm posted by the same user that posted the 
initial defamatory review¾Birdzeye B.117  
 
 109. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunctions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV.  
157 (2007) (discussing, in general, the rule against injunctions in defamation cases, and why courts 
should continue following that rule). The Prior Restraint Doctrine holds unconstitutional court orders 
that censor speech before it takes place. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (The “Pentagon 
Papers” Case), 403 U.S. 713 (1971).  
 110. Chemerinsky, supra note 109, at 157–58. 
 111. See Tory et al. v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738–39 (2005) (due to the plaintiff’s death, the Court 
decided the case on narrow grounds and did not resolve the broad question of whether injunctions are 
allowed in defamation cases). 
 112. 156 P.3d 339, 349 (Cal. 2007). 
 113. Id. at 351–52. 
 114. Chemerinsky, supra note 109, at 171. 
 115. Chemerinsky, supra note 109, at 171. 
 116. Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1341 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 117. Id. at 1345. 
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An injunction requiring the removal of existing defamatory 
language posted to a website would be neither a prior restraint, nor futile. 
Although an individual who defames another on a website could, 
theoretically, repeat the same statement in slightly different language, 
that argument should not preclude injunctions for internet defamation 
causes of action. This is especially true in a case where the plaintiff 
receives a default judgment, such as in Hassell. In such cases, the 
defendant’s disinterest in litigating the claim suggests that defendants 
will be unlikely do anything in response to a website that removes their 
speech. Thus, it is unlikely that a narrow injunction covering only 
existing defamatory language would be ineffective and cause a defendant 
to defame again. 
2. The First Amendment and Enjoining Non-Parties 
Issues related to freedom of expression and the First Amendment 
are the most likely challenges that arise in the context of non-party 
injunctions that enjoin speech. Indeed, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”) filed an amicus letter with the California Supreme Court 
on this matter and asked the court to drop the Court of Appeal’s 
injunction altogether.118 The ACLU argues that a court may not issue an 
injunction to a non-party, even where the non-party has a close 
relationship with the defendant and where the injunction only prohibits 
actions that have been found to be illegal.119 Moreover, the ACLU believes 
that the specific injunction the Court of Appeal issued is not permissible 
given that it requires Yelp to remove arguably protected speech.120 
However, the cases that the ACLU presents do not support these 
arguments, and while the ACLU is correct that the Court of Appeal’s 
injunction is overbroad, the injunction should not be struck down. 
Instead, it should be narrowed to prevent removal of future Bird posts 
and also to provide Yelp and Hassell with the opportunity to argue the 
case on the merits and determine whether Bird’s review is actually 
protected speech. 
The ACLU relies on the case Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc. to assert that the court’s injunction is not permitted.121 
Specifically, the ACLU argues that Zenith Radio supports the notion that 
due process prohibits such an injunction because Yelp did not participate 
 
 118. Amicus Letter, Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (No. A143233) 
(supporting request for review), https://www.aclunc.org/docs/20160815-hassell_amicus_letter.pdf 
(“ACLU Letter”). 
 119. Id. at 1. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1 (citing Zenith Radio v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969)). 
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in the lawsuit and was not an agent of Bird.122 However, this case is 
centered on issues of jurisdiction, not non-party liability. In Zenith 
Radio¾a patent infringement case¾the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed an injunction against the defendant 
corporation, but set aside an identical injunction against a corporate 
subsidiary of the defendant.123 The United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the injunction was 
properly set aside due to a lack of personal jurisdiction.124 The Court 
wrote that “a court has no power to adjudicate a personal claim or 
obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.”125 
The ACLU’s amicus letter overlooks the specificity of the findings in 
Zenith Radio, namely, that the injunction was invalidated for 
jurisdictional reasons.126 It was not invalidated solely for non-party 
reasons. Indeed, there is ample authority permitting courts to enjoin 
parties through which a defendant might act, as set forth at length in Part 
II. 
Perhaps in light of its selective reading of Zenith Radio, the ACLU 
seemingly clarifies its argument related to injunctions running to  
non-parties by noting that such orders are not permitted when they 
prohibit someone’s exercise of free speech.127 This idea is supported in 
Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, discussed below, and 
it merits consideration given that free speech is a constitutionally 
protected right that demands the utmost respect.128 Despite the rule 
against injunctions in defamation cases, the critical failure of this 
argument is that the Yelp review, regardless of whether it is defamatory, 
is not Yelp’s speech. The ACLU acknowledges that as a distributor, Yelp 
has an interest in protecting the speech, like a newspaper.129 However, 
section 230 shields Yelp from liability as an internet service provider, 
unlike in traditional defamation law where publishers are treated as 
speakers. Thus, the ACLU’s argument by analogy is incomplete and 
without merit. No authority supports the idea that a non-party injunction 
regarding internet speech should be under all circumstances barred. The 
court has enjoined Yelp as a publisher, not an original speaker. Although 
the injunction crafted by the Court of Appeal remains problematic,  
 
 122. Amicus Letter, supra note 118, at 4. 
 123. Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 107. 
 124. Id. at 100. 
 125. Id. at 110 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)). 
 126. Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 110. 
 127. Amicus Letter, supra note 118, at 2. 
 128. Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). 
 129. Amicus Letter, supra note 118, at 2. 
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non-party injunctions in defamation cases should not be wholly barred 
because a remedy at law may be unattainable. 
Indeed, if the review were to be considered Yelp’s speech, then Yelp 
would not be protected under section 230.130 Section 230 only protects 
websites and internet providers when someone else’s speech appears on 
them.131 For example, if Yelp, as a website, hired professional reviewers 
to critique restaurants,132 Yelp would not be protected if a court found 
language in such a review to be defamatory. The statute immunizes 
websites from publication and repetition liability¾protections not 
afforded to newspapers and magazines under traditional defamation law. 
Of course, if traditional defamation law applied to internet speech, the 
argument would have merit. However, barring an injunction because it 
would infringe on Yelp’s right to free speech contradicts the way that 
courts have interpreted section 230. As an internet service provider, Yelp 
enjoys section 230’s safe harbor. Therefore, the argument that Yelp’s 
“speech” cannot be enjoined fails because Yelp is not treated as the 
speaker under section 230. Thus, the injunction, in some form, must be 
permitted. 
Nevertheless, according to Carroll, such orders are prohibited when 
the non-party has not received notice and has had no chance to 
participate in the court proceedings.133 Yelp received notice of the 
injunction, is participating in the case, and satisfies the other 
requirement of a non-party injunction, which is the ability to comply. 
Whether Yelp’s level of involvement meets the participation requirement 
set forth in Carroll is unclear. However, in case it does not, the solution 
is simple: the court should give Yelp the chance to defend the defamation 
claim. Indeed, because Hassell received a default judgment, the ACLU 
reluctantly suggests that Yelp should at least have the opportunity to 
defend Bird’s speech.134  
Providing Yelp with the opportunity to defend the defamation claim 
would eliminate possible constitutional law issues related to Bird’s 
reviews because defamatory speech is generally not protected by the First 
Amendment. Procedurally, litigating the defamation claim could also 
relieve the burden on Yelp of having to remove third-party content. When 
considering public policy, litigating the defamation claim appears to help 
both victims of defamation, who would have the opportunity to force 
defamatory statements to be retracted, and websites, which would have 
to institute standards that their users must rise to. This, in effect, 
 
 130. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2011). 
 131. Id. 
 132. The Zagat Guide is a publication that reviews and rates restaurants. 
 133. Carroll, 393 U.S. at 180. 
 134. Amicus Letter, supra note 118, at 6. 
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supports the very purpose of the CDA itself¾it facilitates self-censorship 
of websites, and still grants the immunity that courts have interpreted 
section 230 to provide. 
The ACLU’s amicus letter and the Carroll opinion both support the 
idea that non-party injunctions involving arguably protected speech 
should be crafted narrowly as to avoid disruption of constitutional 
rights.135 If the California Supreme Court narrows the Court of Appeal’s 
injunction to only include the current Yelp reviews, and not future Yelp 
reviews from Bird, the injunction would satisfy the narrow standard 
permitted for such injunctions. If the California Supreme Court also 
remands the case for a new trial on the merits of the defamation claim, 
then Yelp would have the opportunity to defend the speech in order to 
determine whether it would need to comply with the narrower 
injunction. Yelp could try the case, or simply delete the reviews and avoid 
the time and expense associated with the former choice. Regardless of 
what Yelp does, this remedy would have the benefits of satisfying the 
plaintiff’s claim and protecting freedom of expression under the First 
Amendment. 
However, as a practical matter, giving Yelp and other websites a 
chance to defend arguably defamatory language presents a glaring 
problem. Because Yelp only serves as publisher, it would be quite difficult 
to make factual findings with any certainty as to the speech itself. Yelp is 
not prepared to play the role of reporter and investigate the truthfulness 
of reviews posted by users. A defamation claim requires a false 
defamatory assertion of fact concerning the plaintiff.136 This first element 
of defamation can be difficult to prove due to the falsity requirement; it 
often requires courts to have parties testify under oath to determine the 
veracity of an alleged defamatory statement.137 As a result, Yelp would be 
left with quite a challenge should it, on remand, have to defend Bird’s 
review. Indeed, certain statements could be easy to verify. For example, 
that “the [H]assell [L]aw [G]roup didn’t [sic] ever speak to [the insurance 
company]”138 is an easily verified fact. Other statements, such as 
“[Hassell] dropped the case because of her mother,”139 are impossible to 
prove absent some sort of email chain or other form of evidence between 
Hassell and Bird. Even with evidentiary support, the truth of the evidence 
might be unclear. A quick glance at Bird’s review and Hassell’s response 
 
 135. Amicus Letter, supra note 118, at 5; Carroll, 393 U.S. at 183. 
 136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1976). 
 137. Callum Borchers, The New York Times Just Dared Donald Trump to Sue, WASH. POST: THE 
FIX (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/13/donald-trump 
(quoting John Diamond). 
 138. Birdzeye B., supra note 12.Error! Bookmark not defined. 
 139. Birdzeye B., supra note 12. 
K - MARANO_13 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/18 12:54 PM 
May 2018]  CAUGHT IN THE WEB 1331 
to it illustrates this problem perfectly: both contain contradictory 
statements.140 While it would be challenging enough for a finder of fact 
to determine whether Bird’s statements were false if Bird were to come 
to court and litigate the claim herself, it would be an entirely different 
challenge should Yelp be subjected to that task. 
The First Amendment is of principal concern in the context of 
enjoining a non-party for an action related to allegedly defamatory 
speech. Nevertheless, if the speech is judged to be defamatory, First 
Amendment rights can still be protected in the context of internet speech. 
In an action where speech has been adjudged defamatory, courts should 
be permitted to enjoin the internet service providers on which the speech 
appears and have them remove the unprotected speech¾unless of course 
the individual who wrote the language is tried and removes it him or 
herself. In situations such as Hassell, where a default judgment was 
issued, courts should allow the same remedy. That said, the remedy 
should be stipulated to include a trial on the merits in which the website 
is permitted to defend the speech, should the website choose to expend 
the time and effort in doing so. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to a lack of foresight, and perhaps with unbridled optimism, 
members of Congress drafted section 230 of the CDA in a way that today 
is highly ineffective. Rather than encourage the internet self-regulation 
and censorship that Congress hoped section 230 would foster, section 
230 has done little more than provide websites and internet service 
providers with blanket immunity against any claims arising out of 
content posted by third-party users. This safe harbor permits third 
parties, whether maliciously or unintentionally, to defame innocent 
individuals online, all the while requiring no responsibility or care from 
the websites on which they post. The unintended consequences of section 
230 have greatly harmed victims of online defamation, while allowing the 
often-anonymous perpetrators, along with the websites publishing the 
defamatory statements, to enjoy no liability whatsoever. 
Currently faced with Hassell, the California Supreme Court is in the 
unique position of devising an appropriate remedy that will allow victims 
of online defamation to mitigate their damages through injunctions. By 
permitting courts to issue non-party injunctions that would require 
websites and internet service providers to remove defamatory 
statements, individuals who are defamed online will finally begin to 
obtain justice against those who have defamed them. While such 
 
 140. Birdzeye B., supra note 12. 
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injunctions naturally implicate the First Amendment, these injunctions 
can be crafted narrowly so as to ensure that websites are only required to 
remove speech that a court has determined to be defamatory. Such 
narrow injunctions should satisfy attacks from critics who argue that 
injunctions in defamation cases function as prior restraints.141 Although 
these critics also point out that very narrow injunctions are functionally 
useless, arguments exists that show otherwise.142 Ultimately, only when 
a court issues a narrow injunction requiring a website to remove 
defamatory language will it become known with any certainty whether 
the injunction indeed served its purpose.  
While some argue that the burden of this remedy is cost prohibitive 
on the websites due to the time and resources they would have to expend 
deleting content, these costs are a very small price to pay compared with 
the dangers associated with the boundless immunity from liability that 
section 230 grants. The California Supreme Court should modify the 
Court of Appeal’s injunction against Yelp in a way to have it cover only 
speech that currently appears on Yelp, while also giving Yelp the 
opportunity to defend the speech should it choose to do so. Should the 
Court pursue this path, it will pave the way for section 230 to function 
more effectively in the modern internet era, and also encourage the sort 
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